

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP33-02415A000200150020-0  
Department of State

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39-M

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DDP

Action

Control: 12871

INRC

Rec'd: APRIL 20, 1961

105

Info

FROM: ANKARA

9:27 AM

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

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b7d

NO: 1278, APRIL 20, 2 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

PRIORITY

ROGER CHANNEL.

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REFERENCE DEPTEL 1161.

ORIGINATORS MESSAGES CITED REFERENCE TELEGRAM HAVE KEPT ME CURRENTLY INFORMED REGARDING SITUATION AS IT HAS DEVELOPED WITH IMMEDIATE PROBLEM BEING DIFFICULTY, AMID CONFLICTING REPORTS FROM VARIOUS SOURCES, RECONSTRUCT DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN GOT WHICH LED TO ORDER FOR CESSION SUCH FLIGHTS AND ON BASIS SUCH KNOWLEDGE DECIDE ON BEST APPROACH TO EFFECT THEIR RESUMPTION. TAF WORKING LEVEL IS ALLEGED TO HAVE INADVERTENTLY STARTED BALL ROLLING; SOME SEE FOREIGN OFFICE INVOLVEMENT; OTHERS BELIEVE KURTTEKIN, J-2, TGS IS BEHIND PRESENT TURKISH INTRANSIGENCE, WHILE ALL SOURCES INCLUDING BRITISH AND FOREIGN OFFICE AGREE ON KEY ROLES OF TGS AND MOD.

TGS INDICATED TO AIR ATTACHE AS EARLY 4 JUNE 1960 THAT FLIGHT QUESTION MIGHT COME UP FOR REVIEW AT SOME FUTURE DATE. ALTHOUGH INFORMATION IS STILL INCOMPLETE, IT APPEARS LIKELY THAT JUNIOR TAF OPERATIONS OFFICER OVER TWO MONTHS AGO QUESTIONED WHETHER HE COULD CONTINUE AUTHORIZE SCIENTIFIC FLIGHTS ON HIS OWN AUTHORITY. THIS ACTION IS IN NORMAL POST-REVOLUTIONARY PATTERN IN WHICH, OFFICIALS, WORKING IN UNCERTAIN CONDITIONS, HAVE FREQUENTLY SHOWN RELUCTANCE ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY. PROBLEM THEN SNOWBALLED WITHIN TURKISH MILITARY, RESULTING IN DIRECTIVE TO UK AND APPROXIMATELY SIX WEEKS LATER TO US TO DISCONTINUE SCIENTIFIC FLIGHTS BEYOND TURKISH BORDERS PENDING TOP LEVEL DECISION AS TO ADVISABILITY SUCH FLIGHTS. REASONS

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-2- 1278, APRIL 20, 2 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM ANKARA

BEHIND MOMENTUM PROBABLY INCLUDE (1) STRONG DESIRE OF TURKISH MILITARY AS WELL AS FOREIGN OFFICE AND CNU TO AVOID INCIDENTS WITH RUSSIANS; (2) FEELING AMONG UNINFORMED TURKISH MILITARY THAT INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED FROM FLIGHTS HAS NO DIRECT BENEFIT FOR TURKEY; (3) LACK OF APPRECIATION AMONG MOST TURKISH MILITARY IN KEY POSITIONS OF IMPORTANCE THESE FLIGHTS; AND (4) DESIRE NOW COMMON IN TURKISH GOVERNMENT TO KEEP FOREIGN ACTIVITIES IN TURKEY UNDER CLOSER CONTROL.

KEY QUESTION NOW IS TO DECIDE POINT WHERE US CAN MOST EFFECTIVELY ASSERT ITS VIEWS. BRITISH HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY SARPER THAT MATTER NOW UNDER DISCUSSION BY PRESIDENT'S OFFICE (GURSEL OR OZDILEK), ALANKUS AND SARPER HIMSELF. IF THIS IS CORRECT, NATURAL COURSE WOULD BE PROCEED THROUGH ORTHODOX FOREIGN OFFICE CHANNEL. OLCAY, DIRECTOR GENERAL NATO AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, WHO UNDER PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS TRANSMITS BRITISH REQUESTS FOR FLIGHTS TO TURKISH MILITARY, HAS STRONGLY SUGGESTED I SEE SARPER. ON OTHER HAND, CERTAIN TURKISH MILITARY CONTACTS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT I SEE GURSEL DIRECTLY. HOWEVER, I QUESTION ADVISABILITY OF TURNING TO OUR LAST RESORT OVERHASTILY SINCE TURN-DOWN FROM GURSEL WOULD LEAVE NO FURTHER POSSIBILITY FOR ACTION ON MY PART. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY WOULD BE DIRECT APPROACH TO ALANKUS, WHO IS KNOWN TO HAVE STRONG PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH GURSEL AND ALSO MAY BE KEY FIGURE IN MATTER.

HARE

RJT

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